Aquinas:pp. 516-537; 558-564; 558-572, and selections from Mahowald.

See also notes in HOWP files.

Notes from "Latin Philosophy in the 13th century" (Hyman and Walsh's introduction, pp. 451-453)

12 century rise of the University, e.g., the universities of Oxford and Paris (which had royal and papal protection (Hyman and Walsh, p. 451) and the reception of Aristotle in the Latinwest.(Creation of the mendicant orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans played a part in the increasing power of theology in philosophical developments.

The University relied upon two methods of study, the lecture/explication of text, and the disputation in which the student was obligated to debate the master in a formal set debate with the resolution then provided by the master.Dialectic reigned supreme in the trivium[1]--there were public disputations.Though this gave medieval and subsequent philosophy at times the flavor of a logic-chopper's ball, it did have the advantage of getting at least some of the objections to a position taken into consideration in a position's presentation.

Spain and Italy were the conduits of Muslim learning, and the source of the texts which gave rise to the Latin texts of Aristotle.

Notes from Hyman and Walsh's introduction to Aquinas section, pp. 503-508.

Thomas Aquinas had the job of "purging" Aristotle(p. 503), doing what Aquinas said Augustine had done for Plato:"whenever he found in his teaching anything consistent with the faith he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to the faith he amended." (504)

Aquinas has the problem of reconciling Aristotle with revelation since Aquinas has the principle that there is but one unified divine science which cannot contain contradictions.(504)

Reading notes from Hyman and Walsh, pp. 516-537 

Aquinas 516-537; 558-564; 558-572, and selections from Mahowald

Read pp. 516-523, 523-527, pp. 527-531, 532-537; PP. 558-564; PP. 569-572.

================================================================= summary of readings

==================================================================== Summa, pp. 516-537, Question--the nature and domain of sacred doctrine.relation to philosophy.The need of sacred doctrine.Its status as a science; as a non-practical science.Its argumentative character.The legitimacy of scriptural use of metaphor; the multiplicity of meanings of a word in Scripture.READ pp. 516-523

Question II the existence of G.The issue of self-evidence.The possibility of demonstration, the Five ways.[2]Read pp. 523-527}

TA's theory of divine predication as analogy--pp. 527-531.

532-537Providence vs. RAMBAM.And the problem of divine foreknowledge..

PP. 558-564Happiness and its attainment (Note Bene:relation to Aristotle)

PP. 569-572 Question 92ff--of the effects of the law

============================================================ ============================================================ 

The Summa Theologica, Part One.Question 1.The nature and domain of sacred doctrine.

the Summaform (Tell students to know this form and be prepared to write one of their final essays in it)

make sense of the Summa form in terms of the following stages:

Initial Statement of the general issue followed by

1.statement of the question, ("# article:question?")

2.giving the most telling objections, stating them along with a summary of the argumentation for them ("obj. #, It seems that . . .")

3.followed by statement of the thesis to the contrary which is the thesis Aquinas is defending ("on the contrary . . . ")along with basic reasoning.

4."I answer that" followed with a clear explanation of the reasoning.Note the bolstering authorities at every level of proof text and philosophicalargumentation.

5.Reply to the objections.

first article, regarding whether any further doctrine is required beyond the philosophical sciences.

Work through Question of the article, p. 515, HW.Note how here the first objection comes from revelation, the 2d from philosophy.See here how Aquinas is responding to the Euthyphro challenge concerning the need for revelation in objection 2, p. 516.Notice how the pressing need for salvation makes sense of the necessity of revelation.Note how Aquinas seems to be claiming that a certain level of knowledge is necessary for salvation.Note how TA responds to objection 1 by citing the same chapter of Ecclesiasticus.

Second Article:Whether Sacred Doctrine is a science?

Obj. 1--science requires self-evidence.

Obj. 2--science not of individuals.

"on the contrary . . . ":cite from Augustine.

"I answer that"Sacred doctrine is a science, but not one of principles known from the "natural light" of intellect (e.g., math), but rather one whose principles are made known by light of a higher science, in this case the science of God and the blessed.As the musician accepts mathematical principles on authority, so does the sacred science accept revelation from God in order to do its work.

Reply to obj. 1. Principles of a science are either self-evident or reducible to a higher science; with sacred doctrine we have a case of the latter.

Reply to obj. 2.individual facts are not brought into sacred doctrine except as examples, andto establish the authority of those through who the sacred scripture or doctrine has come down to us.

3d Article:Unity of Sacred doctrine:--Aquinas' "I answer that" sacred doctrine is one science.

4th Article:Whether sacred doctrineis a practical science?

[review Aristotle here briefly] Aquinas' "I answer that":Since practical science concerns that which men do and sacred doctrineis chiefly concerned with God, it is to that extent not a practical, but a theoretical science.Note that here Aquinas claims that he has sufficiently answered the objections.The argument is left to the reader, work it out.

***8th Article:Whether sacred doctrine is argumentative?Do this one as a focused reading, given its importance to the faith reason controversy, the unified truth view, etc.

Aquinas ' "I answer that":in terms of argumentation from the principles of sacred doctrine, in terms of the possibility of arguing from sacred doctrineso long as the opponent accepts some of it, provided the opponent makes some concession.Further even when the opponent does not concede, but only objects, these objections can be answered:"Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the proofs brought against faith are not demonstrations, but arguments that can be answered." (519)

discuss Aquinas' reply to the2d objection where he argues that there are degrees of authority; point out the difference between necessary and "probable" arguments.

9th Article:Whether Holy scripture should use metaphors?[see pp. 11-12, overlap, for info on Dionysius].

Talk about Aquinas' claim that this is befitting revelation since, "God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature."(521)Relate this to Maimonides' "Divrei Torah belashon benei adam."

***discuss his replies to the objections with respect to theissue of secret writing.Remind students that Aquinas has read Maimonides.

10th Article:Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?

Aquinas' "I answer that":words can have several senses in scripture all without hindering or departing from the literal sense.

Question II the existence of God.The issue of self-evidence.The possibility of demonstration, the Five ways.[3]Read pp. 523-527

1st Article:The issue of self-evidence.

Mention Thomas' objection to the ontological argument (objection no. 2 here) concerning the lack of a clear concept in the absence of experience.Also consider the argument objection of Obj. 3.Note how Aquinas uses the "fool" in his "on the contrary . . . ".

Point out that the argument still has great currency in some of its modern forms, and that it is still undergoing lively discussion despite its so-called refutation.

discuss self-evidence in terms of "analyticity" where the predicate is included in the subject (Aquinas' example:"Man is an animal."Aquinas explains that a self-evident proposition may be self-evident in itself, but due to a lack of general knowledgeof the essence of the predicate and subject, not self-evident to the majority.TA argues that "because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature--namely by His effects."(523-524)

*** Do Aquinas' Reply to objs. 1-3, p. 524 Hyman and Walsh as focused reading.

2d Article:Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?[4]

Note that Aquinas' "I answer that" is similar to his earlier discussion about God's effect:"Demonstration can be made in two ways:One is through the cause, and is called propter quid, and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely.The other is thorough the effect, and is called a demonstration quia; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us."(524-525)

***If time permits, go over Aquinas' Reply to objs. 1-3.

3d Article:Whether God exists?

Note that Aquinas begins (Obj. 1) with the most serious kind of objection to theism, namely, the problem of evil.He also brings up the objection from the superfluous (Obj. 2).

Then he offers his proofs.

AQUINAS' FIVE WAYS:

Begin by pointing out the basic nature of a cosmological as opposed to an ontological argument in terms of its empiricist basis, relate this to the standard distinctions between Aristotelians and Platonists. Defer lengthy consideration of the problem of evil to the session devoted to that problem.Consider the objection number 2.

Acquaint them with Aristotle's Doctrine of the four causes [material, formal, final, efficient]; explain them and the Aristotelian notion of motion as change.Put them in touch with the Aristotelian notion of true possibility as interpreted by many of the medievals [point out that this argument has serious precedents in Arabic and Judeo-Arabic philosophy].

Go' thru the arguments on page 525 ff (arguments from motion, efficient cause, possibility and necessity, gradation, governance of the world; do these as focused readings.Try to sort them out as best you can.).Point out that they are summaries for the elite of his day.

Treat motion (explain that motion and change are tightly related in Aristotle) and efficient cause.

then discuss the argument from contingency as the paradigmatic cosmological argument [pointing out that that name is sometimes reserved for this argument in particular]. 

Relate the argument from gradation to Plato and Augustine. 

Briefly treat the argument from governance of the world, discuss the argument from design in more detail.

TA's theory of divine predication as analogy--pp. 527-531.[5]

Question XIII:The names of God

2d Article:Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?

Aquinas considers Maimonides' position (pp. 528 top) before his own "I answer that":" . . . names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly.So when we say, God is good, the meaning is not, God is the cause of goodness, or, God is not evil; but the meaning is, Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God, and in a higher way [see other notes from HWP].Hence it does not follow that God is good because he causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because he is good.As Augustine says, Because he is good, we are." (528 ft.)

5th Article:Whether What is said of God and of creatures is Univocally Predicated of them?

"on the contrary . . .wisdom in the creatures is a quality, but not in God.Now a change in genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things.Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally."(529)

Aquinas' "I answer that": is that names are used of God and creatures in an analogous sense."that is, according to proportion."(530)

2 ways of having this kind of analog of proportion.When many are proportioned to one, e.g., "(healthy is predicated of medicine and the urine inrelation and in proportion to the health of the body, of which the latter is the sign and the former the cause), or according as one thing as proportioned to another (thus health is said of medicine and an animal. since medicine is the cause of health in an animal body."NOTE THAT THIS SORITING OUT WHERE THERE IS ASIMILARITY IN MEANIYING between THJE TWO TWERMS SINCE THERE IS SPROPORTION TO THE SAME THING, YET with ONE BEING THE CAUSE AND THE OTHER THE SIGN IS COMING CLOSE TO Maimonides' attributes OF ACTION.

Yet there is a sense in which this is as Aquinas claims a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation.(530)

Question XIX.The will of God

8th Article:Whether The will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?

(discuss doctrine of predestination; mention calvin (1509-64))

Discuss the arguments in the objections (p. 531).Aquinas' general answer is that God wills some things to be done necessarily, others contingently.

***As time permits, do focused reading on paragraph before the replies to the objections on p. 532.

Question XXII: the Providence of God

Note the resurfacing of the problem of evil in Obj. 2.Note also the summary of Maimonides' position in middle of 533.Aquinas' "I answer that":he argues for universal providence for all individual things.But note his definition of providence as "nothing other that the notion of the order of things towards an end, as we have said,, it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in being, must to that extent be subject to divine providence."(last full paragraph, p. 533)Note the possible similarity to Maimonides' position.

Also regarding the problem of evil, note his reply to Obj. 2, p. 534.discuss his response to Maimonides, p. 535.

As time permits, discuss further Aquinas' ideas on immediate providence by means of intermediaries.

[532-537Providence vs. RAMBAM.And the problem of divine foreknowledge]

qqq

MAKE SURE THAT Maimonides' theory OF THE PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE LAW HAS BEEN EXPLAINED before DOING Aquinas

Continue here next printing.PP. 558-564

Happiness and its attainment (Note Bene:relation to Aristotle)

Question II: Of those things in which Man's Happiness Consists

8th Article:Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?Aquinas' "on the contrary . . . ":cites Augustine citing scripture that God is man's life of happiness.Aquinas' "I answer that":impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness since the will 's object is the universal good, as the object of the intellect is truth.God alone satisfies the demand for the universal good (Note Bene: relation to William James' psychology).

Question III:What is Happiness?

Fourth Article:Whether, if Happiness is in the Intellective Part, It is an operation of the Intellect of the Will?

Objections argue for will.

Aquinas' "on the contrary . . . " is that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.The willing is not the attainment for all that the delight in the attainment is a function of the will (if wishes were horses . . . )

Fifth Article:Whether Happiness is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?

objections argue for practical intellect

Aquinas' "I answer that":Happiness consists in the operation of the speculative rather than the practical intellect," after an "on the contrary . . . " from Augustine concerning contemplation being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys."

Aquinas argues this on the bias of man's intellect function being the highest aimed at the highest in contemplating the divine

on the basis of the intrinsic value of contemplation

on the similarity to the divine God and angels when people engage in contemplation. 

Eighth Article:Whether man's Happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?

Aquinas' "I answer that":"Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the divine Essence.

people are not happy so long as there remains something for them to seek and desire

and the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object (now the object of an intellect is what a thing is (cites DE anima iii.6), i.e., its essence.people desire to know the cause of the effects and wonder (metaphysics born in wonder)and desires to know more of God than that God is.[p. 562, possibility for focused reading]

Question V:of the attainment of Happiness

Fifth Article:Whether man can attain Happiness by his natural powers?

objections argument that people can attain happiness by their own natural powers

but Aquinas' "on the contrary . . . " is that people cannot attain but an imperfect happiness through their own efforts.

his "I answer that" explains that since people's perfect happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence (which apparently involves some help from God).

Questions LXI the cardinal virtues (temperance justice prudence and fortitude)--

First Article: Aquinas holds that these moral virtues are the cardinal virtues

Second Article: that there are these four

that the formal principle of prudence is the consideration itself of reason . . .IF COVER DO FOCUSED READING ON FOTT 565 FF.TO SEE HOW Aquinas subdivides the virtues--Aquinas holds in Reply to obj. 1 that prudence is the principle of all the virtues.

Question LXII--of the theological virtues (faith hope and charity)

First Article [Whether there are any theological virtues?] explains that these are called theological virtues since they are necessary to people in order to be directed to supernatural happiness, since their object is God inasmuch as they direct us aright to God; and because they are infused in us by God alone, and since they are (3) not made known to us save by divine revelation contained in holy writ. [close paraphrase of p. 567, virtually a quote--GOTO TEXT].

Second Article:Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and the moral virtues

Aquinas argues that the theological virtues are distinct sine they are above people's nature whereas the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to human nature.Furthermore, he explains in his "I answer that" that the divine object of the theological virtues is God who surpasses the knowledgeof our reason, whereas the objects of the other virtue are comprehensible to our reason.

[68-569]Third Article:Aquinas responds to the question here "Whether Faith Hope and Charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues" in the affirmative.Intellect has faith, the will hope, and spiritual union where will is transformed into its end (so to speak he says)--charity.

PP. 558-564Happiness and its attainment (Note Bene:relation to Aristotle)

PP. 569-572 Question 92ff--of the effects of the law

PP. 569-572 Question 92ff--of the effects of the law

Question XCII.Of the effects of the law

First Article:Whether an effect of law is to make Men good?

Aquinas' "I answer that"is affirmative since he defines a law as "nothing else that a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed." [570]

Question XCIV.The Natural Law

First Article:Whether the Natural Law is a Habit?

Aquinas' position:properly and essentially the Natural Law is not a habit since "as Augustine says, a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." [571]But "the Natural Law is something appointed by reason."Secondly, we can call a habit that which we hold by habit, in this sensesince sometimes the Natural Law is in the reason only habitually, it is in this sense a habit.===RENIND STUDENTS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HABIT IN ARISTOTLE===

AFTER P. 572

there are several precepts of Natural Law

the Natural Law is the same in all men, applications differ(see ft. 574)--NOTE relation TO RELATIVISM CHALLENGE==================

THE NATURAL law cannot be changed, except in the sense of addition to enhance it.Not in subtraction.

IT was useful for laws to be framed by men in order to train people for virtue

Valid human law is derived from Natural Law

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