[These are my lecture notes for the Al-Gazali material in
Hyman and Walsh.  My notes from Flew's Short Dictionary of
Philosophy are supplemented by notes from Weinberg and my
own reading notes.]   Comments, additions, and corrections are welcome.  
Please send them to:  
email: KAGAN@maple.lemoyne.edu 





                    ALGAZALI 1058-1111
                    
Discuss Islam briefly.
Abu Muhammad.  Main works:  Tahaafut al-Falaasifah,
completed 1095 (The Incoherence of the philosophers); Ihyaa'
`Uluum al-Diin (The revival of the Religious sciences, c.
1100), and al-Munqidh min al-Dalaal (Deliverance from Error,
c. 1108).  Discuss possible biblical and Quranic
significance of the titles.
He suffered a spiritual crisis in 1095 that resulted in a
speech impediment and nervous breakdown; he then gave up the
academic life for the ascetic regime of a Sufi, with a three
year return to academia.  His project was to defuse the
tensions between philosophy and theology.  He used
syllogistic to rebut Neoplatonism and bolster Islamic
doctrine.
According to Julius R. Weinberg, Algazali criticized
philosophers for denying bodily resurrection, G's knowledge
of particulars, and for affirming the eternality of the
universe.  Weinberg also asserts that Algazali's critique of
causality anticipates Hume's, with Algazali arguing
(following the Asharite Mutikallimun) that G is the only
real cause, and Algazali thus denies the so-called necessity
between cause and effect in order to make room for miracles.
He points out that there is no logical contradiction, thus
no logical impossibility.  Observation only presents
simultaneity.  (discussed in Weinberg, pp. 122--124).
Reading notes from Hyman and Walsh
Deliverance from Error, pp. 267-
Algazali begins by suggesting that there are 4 kinds of
seekers,
     1.  the Mutikallimun theologians who see themselves as
     exponents of thought and intellectual speculation,
     2.  the Baatiniiyah--party of authoritative
     instruction, aiming to get truth from an infallible
     imam
     3.  the philosophers, who see themselves as exponents
     of logic and demonstration
     4.  the Sufis who claim vision and intuitive
     understanding through entering into the "presence" of
     G.
Then a la Kohelet [Ecclesiastes] he tells how he's tried them all.
The theologians do their job okay which is to defend the
creed from heretics, and relied on using their opponent's
beliefs to debate them.  This not enough for Algazali, who
wanted to begin with something better.
So he tried philosophy.  He rejected the materialists
(deniers of G's role in the universe, affirmers of the
eternality of the world).
He praises the Naturalists for seeing G through G's
creation.  But they deny the future life, and the end of
says.
The Theists he praises for their criticism of the
materialists and the naturalist.  He criticizes the mistaken
pious who reject everything the philosophers teach in order
to  reject their heresies.  Rather, Algazali claims, their
work falls under 3 heads--what must be counted as unbelief,
what must be counted as heresy, and what is not to be denied
at all.  Algazali then discusses the 6 philosophical
sciences:  math, logic, natural science, theology, politics,
ethics.
     1.  Math:  2 drawbacks, one is thinking that since
     mathematicians such clear thinkers they should also
     know the truth about religion.  The second is rejecting
     math a la babe in bath water.
     2.  Logic:  The mistake is to that hey take rejections
     of religion without applying their normally strict
     standards of proof.
     3.  Natural science or physics.  OK so long as one
     realizes that G rules over nature and it doesn't act of
     itself.
     4.  Theology or Metaphysics wrong regarding
     resurrection, G's knowledge  of particulars, the
     eternality of the world.
     5.  Politics he says they do by considering worldly and
     govt. advantage.
     6.  Their ethics varies depending on the men they base
     it upon.
          2 evil tendencies one theirs, one their opponents:
     The opponents sometimes overdo it "ad hominemly"--e.g.,
     when they hear a Christian say there is no G but G and
     Jesus is The messenger of G.  "It is customary with
     weaker intellects thus to take the men as criterion of
     truth and not the truth as the criterion of the men."
     (Algazali in Hyman and Walsh, p. 274).  Algazali then
     goes on to point out that the public should be
     protected, that we "should shut the gate" lest they get
     themselves into trouble due to their own conceit ("I
     can handle this").  Yet, if we had to reject everything
     these philosophers say, we'd have to reject our own
     doctrines as well, whenever they agree with us or cite
     us as do the Brethren of Purity.
     The partisans sometimes commit the opposite
     error-seeing the good stuff they accept the bad, again,
     e.g., in the writings of the Ihwan--since they include
     the pieties, they accept the rest uncritically.
     Algazali AGAIN ARGUES THAT THE PEOPLE SHOULD BE
     PROTECTED FORMAT HIS MATERIAL AS A SNAKE CHARMER MUST
     REFRAIN FROM HANDLING SNAKES IN FRONT OF A SMALL BOY,
     LEST THE CHILD IMITATE AND BE HARMED.
He then turns to mysticism, from which he claims to have
learned the truth about prophecy.  We grow, he explains,
from touch, to sight, to hearing, to taste,; then to
discernment (7 yrs. or so), to intellect; then to the next
stage, a hint of which is in dreams (Note Bene:  this is
also in Jewish tradition and discussed by RAMBAM.)  He has
the fun discussion (p. 281) about those who didn't dream yet
heard of it), and considers their objections   (I think I
may have read about this in Bahya as well):
     1.  doubt of prophecy's possibility in general
     2.  doubt of its actual occurrence
     3.  doubt of the attainment of it by a particular
     individual
The proof of the possibility is the occurrence of other
knowledge thought to be inconceivable, e.g., medical science
and astronomy.  The dream state clues us in to the
possibility of some of the other properties of prophecy.
Particular candidates for the title prophet are to be judged
by their character, not by miracles.
The incoherence of the philosophers
Algazali begins by pointing out that there's no logically
necessary connection between C & E.  He then considers
cotton burning in contact with fire.
O asserts that the fire causes the cotton to burn and that
this is necessary and sufficient (make sure that these are
defined).
Algazali says no, G is the cause. and G could do it
otherwise.
All they have is experiences of the one accompanied by
experiences of the other.  And to the objection that we then
know nothing, Algazali  is content to rest on habit & even
if there were these internal natures which necessitated
causality, G could change them too.
P. 289 foot, does not have G committing the logically
impossible (give the definitions here!).
In short it seems that Algazali is claiming that we know a
la Hume and habit, but that our knowledge is of a class of
possibles that G might change.  If we trust G not to change
them, that is trust.